On being framed (by the mind).
A study in naive metaphysics.

[Fragments]

Metaphors we live in

We can assume without a high risk of controversy that all entities populating the manifest image of the world (in the sense of Sellars 1956) have to do with places and boundaries: Each of them must have an address; they all must be somewhere; each of them starts somewhere or at some moment in time, and must end somewhere or some time, too. For example, my computer occupies a specific portion of the universe, the table fills its own fraction, and these two are sharply delineated from each other by their surfaces. Not surprisingly, therefore, the concepts of location and boundary have become targets of disciplined ontological investigations in recent years, in conjunction with studies on the parthood relation (see Perzanowski 1993; Smith 1996; Casati & Varzi 1999; Smith & Varzi 1999; Varzi 2007, and more recently Kleindsmidt 2014). This paper is intended to contribute to this field, too, by providing an ontological examination of the following two functionally different kinds of *bounded loci*: containers and frames.

However, the topic becomes more intricate as soon as we realize that we are also accustomed to deeming the conscious mind a sort of bounded locus for our inner lives, populated with thoughts, impressions, sense data and other internal entities which we could keep in secret, thus occlude inside our minds or souls, or share with others if we wanted to, thereby targeting the borderline between *the internal* and *the external* as a bonafide barrier. This appealing view has been dubbed, by no means enthusiastically, *the bucket theory of mind* by Karl Popper (...). Where does it come from? Part of an answer is provided by those who outlined and amply elaborated on the tendency to imagine mental realms employing metaphors drawing on the material world, filled with "women, fire, and dangerous things", to use the title of George Lakoff's (1989) famous book. And likely among the most appealing ideas forged over the course of observation of the material world and our own bodies is the idea of container and containment. Mark Johnson points out:

> The CONTAINER schema defines the most basic distinction between IN and OUT. We understand our own bodies as containers - perhaps the most basic things we do are ingest and excrete, take air into our lungs and breathe it out. But our understanding of our own bodies as

containers seems small compared with all the daily experiences we understand in CONTAINER terms.

Hence, it seems clear that *location* and *boundaries* in general, and *containment* in particular, are among the central concepts that set up both our folk physics and our folk psychology.

However, from the ontological perspective, the concept of a container is, contrarily to what Johnson suggests, quite sophisticated. A proper grasp of it requires at least three ingredients. Firstly, we need a theory of location since, apparently, containers are places where some other things can be put. Secondly, we need an account of boundaries insofar as containers are at least partially closed or bounded (e.g., as an open box or a vase). These two formal endeavors enable us to unpack what I refer here provisionally as the *structural* features of containment. However, the boundaries in question must play specific functional roles: if you put your wallet into a pocket in your jacket, you want it to be secured and hardly accessible to others there. Therefore, thirdly, we have to tackle somehow this *functional* aspect, too.

The mentioned authors have mainly done the appropriate formal work on the structural features. Meanwhile, although they did provide good starting points for analysis of the functional factors (e.g., Smith & Varzi 1999), there's still much to do. Therefore, I shall be interested primarily in providing an ontological treatment for the latter.

Here is the core intuition to be unpacked more "technically" later on: while in containment the function of boundaries is to "block" various bonds between the contained entity and some (or all) of the other things (think of your wallet hidden in the pocket again), we can also speak of framing where the function of boundaries is the opposite: they make some (or all) of these bonds possible. And, interestingly, these two situations can be identical in all other respects: think of a cartoon box where you can hide something, and then think of an equal box, yet made of glass, serving as a showcase in a museum, where some precious items are exhibited. Hence, I shall elaborate on the difference between *containing* and *framing* based on the distinction between the two functions of boundaries: *enabling* and *disabling the connection* between entities (the notion of connection to be characterized later on).

I shall use the notion of framing in the fields of philosophy of mind and perception. In the following two sections, I briefly justify this concentration.

From mind-as-a-place to mind-in-a-place.

There is a dramatic shift these days in the philosophical thinking of minds and places: the move from what I'm inclined to provisionally call the mind-*as*-a-place model exemplified by

the bucket theory, to the mind-*in*-a-place model. The latter says that the mind is not a locus for any entities (impressions, thoughts, mental representations or the like), but is *constituted by its location in an environment*. The latter means that the mind wouldn't be *a mind* if it hadn't been placed in a web of direct relations with things in its surroundings. The shift has come to the fore in recent years, primarily due to the groundbreaking work of Francisco Varela and his collaborators (Varela, Thompson, Rosh 1991), in the guise of the cluster of proposals in the philosophy of mind, broadly construed, called embodied mind or enactivism (see...). Alva Noe famously proclaims that perception "is not something that happens to us, or in us"; it is neither an "input from the world to mind," nor "a process in the brain whereby the perceptual system constructs an internal representation of the world." In his newer book, he makes similar claims referring to consciousness, putting stress on the conviction that the latter is not "something that happens inside us." He then invites us to "appreciate the fact that we feel and think and that the world shows up for us (...) without believing that there is a place, or a moment in time, when and where consciousness happens or comes to be inside of us". Noe sets forth an idea that "[t]he locus of consciousness is the dynamic life of the whole, environmentally plugged-in person or animal."

The abandonment of the mind-as-a-place model finds its outlets not only among prophets of the enactivist movement. There is also a broad effort in a more old-fashion philosophy of perception aiming at such an understanding of perception that renders the latter a means for getting access to real things in the world, not just to our mental constructs (the term "acquaintance" is frequently used in this context; see, e.g., Dickie 2010). In other words, it is a revival of direct realism in more radical, i.e., anti-representationalist (e.g., Brewer 2007; Martin...), or more moderate (e.g., Schellenberg 2011; McDowell 2013) versions. These conceptions hold, in short, "that any perception essentially involves at least three components: a subject; the environment of the subject, and an awareness or acquaintance relation between the subject and certain element of her environment" (Schellenberg 2011: 717).

The announced goal of this investigation can now be made more accurate: my purpose here is to examine the concepts of containment and framing to reformulate the mind-as-a-place model. However, someone might ask why is it supposed to be worth our effort.

Location, content, and the space of reasons

Proponents of the mind-as-a-place model have at least one serious reason to stick with their view. It stems from a *desideratum* stipulating that a comprehensive account of our cognitive functioning must not ignore or neglect the following two facts.

Firstly, as Tim Crane (2001) puts it, minded creatures not only are *in* the world, but also the world is somehow *for* them; that they also *have a world*. In other words, the world presents itself thus and so to minded creatures, depending on their cognitive capacities (there is a way the world is for the human being and a different way the world is for, say, a bat; see Nagel 1974). In the same spirit, Schellenberg observes that it is "a common ground that perceptual experience presents the world as being one way rather than another" (Schellenberg 2011: 714).

Secondly, the mentioned desideratum stipulates also that a theory of the mind must not neglect that fact that at least we, humans, are not only doers but also *understanders* (see Haugeland....; McDowell...). The latter means that we reflect upon things in the world, and we position ourselves with respect to them by exercising our intellectual capacities, imposing our conceptual schemata; we have beliefs, values, expectations, etc.

These two points jointly come to the fore in Schellenberg who states that the mere fact that things always "seem a certain way" to subjects means that the latter's encounter with their surroundings bears content. In other words, she argues that it would be hardly plausible to account for the world's being a certain way in perception, without mentioning the conceptual frameworks which make sense of our surrounding as we see it, enabling us to discriminate, order and conceptualize the encountered objects. In this approach, having a world and being able to understand the world are two sides of one phenomenon[1]. The desideratum shall not be discussed separately due to lack of space (parts of this debate are scattered in the literature, including.....). I assume that it makes sense, at least provisionally, to build on it.

Having the desideratum set, think of Wilfrid Sellars (...) and John McDowell (1994) who speak of "placing something in the normative framework constituted by the logical space of reasons" (McDowell 1994: xiv). The metaphorical and explicitly locative concept of *space of reasons* is supposed to refer to precisely the "space" of contents, of beliefs and their justification. Thus to a "place" where the mentioned pursuit of understanding takes place, and where *having a world* is realized.

Note also in this context what Barbara Tversky writes:

> The use of space for general thought is especially evident in the spaces people create to serve as tools to augment their own cognition, spaces in the world that serve internal spaces in the mind. (Tversky 2008: 208)

Now, the question is what are these "internal spaces in the mind," when taken seriously, i.e., not just as a *façon de parler*, and how they are related to the alleged "external" spaces,

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[1] John Searle (1994) speaks in this context of the aspectual shape of perception.....

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i.e., to the realm of mind-independent entities. It is clear that there must be a link between these two when Tversky invokes the peculiar "spaces" supposed to augment cognition and to "serve the internal spaces of the mind."[2]

Therefore, if the environment which we are (supposedly) directly acquainted with is to present a certain way for us, and as such become the target of our understanding, then it must be somehow placed within the bounds of the space of reasons or inside the internal spaces of the mind. Meanwhile, thinking of the latter seems naturally committed to the mind-as-a-place paradigm. How then could something be placed in the environment and at the same time in the space of reasons/internal space of the mind? The proper task of this paper is to resolve this tension by a more thorough examination of the locative concepts, usually transparent to philosophers working on the mentioned issues, yet already elaborated on by members of some other parties within the discipline.

I shall use the term "space of reasons" as the umbrella term for all spatial-metaphorical grasps of our intellectual capacities. Thus I take it in a more liberal sense, instead of digging into an exegesis of what Sellars and McDowell exactly mean. Now, the critical case which I am inclined to make is that the very idea of space of reasons is not subordinate to the bucket theory of mind. Admittedly, the mind thought of as a container has been up to this point regarded as the most natural *realization* of the abstract idea of space of reasons. I can relatively easily account for my being not only an acting but also a reflecting creature facing the world a certain way by appealing to the view that my reflective life takes place in a particular medium within the bounds of my mind. Here, my contemplative life means my *inner* life populated with my thoughts, beliefs, ideas, memories, etc. Had the bucket theory be abandoned, accounting for the space of reasons becomes more challenging, yet not impossible. The concept at stake is, I believe, abstract enough to accommodate more than one realization.

This investigation is fuelled by the belief that one can do justice to the idea of space of reasons within the mind-as-a-place paradigm without the burden of the bucket theory of mind, thereby accommodating certain pivotal tenets of the mind-in-a-place approach.

Naive metaphysics of the mind

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[2] These peculiar "spaces" are recently referred to as cognitive niches (Pinker...; Clark 2008; Bertolotti & Magnani 2017; Werner 2018), meaning realms that surround the cognizer, but are rearranged to improve action, decision-making, remembering, etc. As such, they seem to provide a middle ground between the two extremes: the internal and the external.

Let me stress upfront that we are talking about the *mind*, not about the brain here. It is trivially true that the brain is contained in the body and it is trivially true that it must maintain connections, via the nervous system, with things in the surroundings. The whole debate becomes deeply nontrivial as we move to the domain of the mind - of thoughts, percepts, contents, etc. Can *this* domain be captured by locative concepts, too? Here we find the struggle between the mind-as-a-place and the mind-in-a-place paradigms. So, I stay neutral as to whether or not the mind can exist without the brain - a safe option would be to agree upon the mind's being an emergent product of the brain - but I must admit that if one claims that the mind entirely reduces to the brain, then this whole ontological pursuit becomes trivial, indeed.

My setting of this investigation draws then on the proposal by Kit Fine (2016) who has recently come up with the idea of distinguishing between naive metaphysics and foundational metaphysics. The latter aims at outlining a nature of entities that the world is ultimately composed of; the matter or substance of the world (if any). On the other side Fine postulates a pursuit dedicated to the manifest image - naive metaphysics. The latter encapsulates both folk psychology and folk physics in a unified, organized and disciplined attempt to list all kinds of entities populating the manifest image and fathom their natures. And it seems clear that insofar as the manifest image is at stake, there are minds in it.

Therefore, in my understanding, naive metaphysics is also the place where specific metaphors capturing the manifest image of the world, including the metaphor of containers, are examined, theoretically unpacked and deliberatively used. Here giving up one metaphor, i.e., the one appealing to containers, moves us unavoidably toward a different metaphor, not toward a supposedly metaphor-free scientific image. A particulalry telling illustration of this fact comes from the introductory paragraph of Susana Siegel's entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. She writes there:

> When one speaks of the contents of a bucket, one is talking about what is spatially inside the bucket. An analogous use of "the contents of perception" would pick out what is 'in the mind' when one has a perceptual experience. In contrast, when one speaks of the contents of a newspaper, one is talking about what information the newspaper stories convey. Most contemporary uses of "the contents of perception" take such contents to be analogous to the contents of a newspaper story, rather than the contents of a bucket. This notion of content can straightforwardly accommodate the idea that there is such a thing as the 'testimony of the senses.' (Siegel....)

However, Siegel's metaphor neglects the most controversial issue. Crane aptly points out that "if a proposition were the content of a perceptual experience, then it should be capable of being negated, disjoined, conjoined, etc." (Crane 2008: 11). Meanwhile, it seems that "the testimony of the senses", to use Siegel's nice phrase, does not have this built-in logical

structure by itself. This means, in my reading, that the said "testimony" is not by itself part of the space of reasons. It has to be *introduced* there, and now the crucial thing is to explicate how it happens.

Going back to the bucket theory of mind, if you believe that "the testimony of the senses" is itself mental (e.g., composed of sense-data), then the task of introducing it into the space of reasons seems at least doable. However, if you want to hold that this testimony is not mental, but places *real things* in view, as the newly revamped direct realism insists, the job becomes more challenging. Let me reiterate the already articulated query: How is it possible for a real thing existing in the external world, to become part of the space of reasons which is in principle set by the mind? *Since we cannot help employing metaphors*, as the quotation from Siegel aptly illustrated, *we need a new metaphor and a new naive-metaphysical theory to answer this question*.

I start with a more detailed examination of the idea of containment which is laid down in the bucket theory to articulate the latter more precisely and then unveil an alternative.

An initial account of containment.

If the container metaphor is about to be unpacked, linguists come up as first responders. Hence, I shall start from what they teach us about the preposition "in" which is, together with its counterparts in different languages, usually understood as exactly the preposition articulating containment. This will be the background against which I shall seek a more abstract picture.

Basic terminology used by the linguists distinguishes a trajector (TR) and a landmark (LM). The so-called proto-scene for the preposition "in", outlining its most primitive sense and serving as the template for all its derivative meanings, is "a spatial relation in which a TR is located within an LM which has three salient structural elements – an interior, a boundary and an exterior" (Tyler & Evans 2003: 183; see also Herskovits 1986; Talmy 1983, 2000; Vandeloise 1991, 1994). We can imagine here a box and a thing in it, so that there is a clear line dividing the space inside the box, filled only partially by the thing, and the space outside the box.

The first thing that stands out in this basic structure is segmentation, meaning that containment usually provides order by introducing certain boundaries or divisions:

> An important aspect of bounded LMs is the notion of a boundary, which in part distinguishes between interior and exterior. (...) The notion of segmentation or boundedness is privileged. A salient aspect of spatial scenes involving bounded LMs is that they serve to partition the

environment, providing a physical means of separation and delimitation. (Tyler & Evans 2003: 196)

This interior-exterior schema depicted by the proto-scene defines containment as approached by Johnson (1987), however, according to Tyler & Evans (2003), there are also certain salient functional factors contributing to the proto-scene (see Herskovits 1986). They write:

> Typically, being in such a TR–LM configuration has consequences for both the TR and the LM. For instance, the surrounding LM will often offer physical protection from outside forces and hide the TR from outside view (...). Thus, the spatial configuration is not conceived as neutral, but as meaningful and consequential; we understand this TR–LM configuration in terms of, and hence giving rise to, the concept of containment. (Ibid.: 25)

Hence, containment is not just a mere arrangement of the TR and the LM. Articulating containment requires spelling out more complex bonds between the listed building blocks. Tyler and Evans make it clear that the TR is *occluded* by the boundaries of the LM so that the former is at least partially inaccessible from outside of the latter. Think of a toy hidden in a box, thus a paradigmatic situation for a child: Once the toy is locked up in the box, the child cannot get it and cannot even see it.

There is one more feature of containment which is not sufficiently outlined by Tyler & Evans. Sinha & Lopez (2000) provide a nice illustration of what I would like to bring in here, although they stress a different aspect of the situation: If you move a cup of coffee, the coffee goes with the cup. Containers, then, constrain the movements of their contents by altering causal chains between them and other things in the world (things outside the container). However, let me outline a more general feature. Namely, it seems that containers, by providing specific kinds of boundaries (yet, it is not necessary for *all* kinds of boundaries), cut off the contained entities from their past environment are replace them to another environment or set up a different environment for them. This phenomenon is not merely about segmentation which suggests that the same setting is just rearranged; it is about bringing forth a *new* environment for the entity. The cup of coffee is perhaps not a very appealing example since one can hardly say anything positive about what an environment of the coffee had been before it was poured into the cup. But think of an animal wandering through a forest and suddenly finding itself caught up in a hidden cage, hardly discernible in the midst of plants. The animal finds itself trapped, thus cut off from the natural environment of the forest even if the cage itself is still physically located in the forest.

Hence, to conclude this part, I propose that containment is characterized by the following three conditions:

(Encompassment): the TR is enclosed within the boundaries of LM

(Occlusion): the TR is at least partially inaccessible from outside of the LM

(Replacement): the TR is moved to another environment; the LM sets up a new environment for the TR.

Naive metaphysics of containment

Unpacking containment requires tacking on these three factors: Encompassment, Occlusion, and Replacement. To succeed in this task, I shall make use of several concepts already introduced into philosophy: location, parthood, boundary, connection, and power (or enabler). Since there is a body of literature devoted to each of them, I shall take them for granted, believing that philosophy should also develop incrementally, by building on what has already been built. I point out clearly the places where I introduce relatively new concepts. Having that set, I shall be able to articulate the major intuition referring to containment, namely that the situation in which x contains y boils down to the fact that, firstly, x encompasses y; secondly - and crucially - x intervenes somehow in y's connections with other entities, making them unlikely or blocking them altogether.

In the first place, following Perzanowski 1993, Casati & Varzi 1999, Varzi 2007 I introduce here the relation "x is located in (at) y", assuming that one can intuitively understand what it means that a stone plunged into water occupies a certain place, and the place is not occupied by the water. Location here refers to what is called *exact* location in the literature, meaning the region occupied precisely by an entity and no more than that. My exact location is, in a sense, the hole filled perfectly by my body (Casati & Varzi 1999). So when I say that I am located in my kitchen, I appeal to some derivative sense of location which is about to be characterized later on. So, by the phrase "location of x," I mean the "region" where x is (exactly) located.

Noteworthy, the notion of location accommodates not only the cases referring to (folk) physical space, in spite of the fact that the latter delivers most appealing examples. Think, however, of the following case. I can speak of my location in New York City thought of as a portion of land, but I can also speak of my location in New York City thought of as an institution, thus within certain institutional bounds. There is a variety of conditions that can determine a "space" and therefore the primitive notion of location refers to the intuition that whether or not the "space" actually in question is set up by such factors as rivers, seas, hills, and valleys, or by such factors as the act of consolidation of City of Greater New York from January 1, 1898, I can say that there is a "region" or "address" occupied solely by me, owned by me and nobody/nothing else.

So, when I say "I am in NYC today, so I cannot see you in downtown Los Angeles within an hour," I mean my location in physical space, but when I say "I am in NYC, so I can earn at least 13 dollars per hour" I refer to my location in a certain "institutional" space set up by specific acts of legislation. Imagine a powerful god who moves NYC magically to southern California - this would make the first statement false (disregarding the traffic, of course), but the second would stay true. Hence, the primitive notion of location does not hinge on any account of space; on the contrary, the space in question is always derivative from the kind of location at stake.

However, the exact location is not sufficient to tackle encompassment as the latter must be a relation occurring between two *objects*, for example, me and my apartment, not a relation between an object and its region. Finally, it must not be a relation between regions themselves, as it is the case in the purely formal theory of location set forth by Casati & Varzi 1999. Yet, at the same time, encompassment is a relation binding objects that necessarily involves some reference to their regions. So it is different from such cases as, e.g., my heart's being part of my body or humans' belonging to the group of mammals.

Parthood relation, however, is of crucial importance for the conceptual framework rolled out here. Things populating the manifest image are such that they have parts, e.g., my desk, my computer or my own body, or such that they are parts of something, e.g., my monitor which is part of my computer. Processes have parts or temporal segments too, such as the process called "running" composed of a large number of quick steps or jumps. And there are also parts of systems so that, for example, my computer is part of the global network of computers.

Hence, "x is a proper part of y" is taken for granted here, drawing on the Leśniewski (1916), Leonarad & Goodman (1940), Simons (1987), among others, and it rounds up all the mentioned exemplifications.

If we have location and parthood set, there appears a nice way to capture encompassment as a relation occurring between objects, yet defined in terms of their regions. I propose:

(1) x encompasses y iff the location of x is a proper part of the location of y.

Here the fact that x encompasses y does mean that x somehow envelopes y within a given portion of space, but y is *not* necessarily closed there. Imagine a stage set outdoor in a park and an actor on it. The stage encompasses the actor so that the location of the latter is a proper part of the location of the former, but the actor is by no means contained there.

Now, if we are to characterize containment, some new notions are needed, too. Let us pay attention to the manifest image again. Things are continuous or discontinuous. For example,

there is continuity between the top of my kitchen table and its legs, while there is a discontinuity between the table and a book lying on it. Now, the top and the legs are parts of the table, but they do not share any parts, and similarly, my arm and my heart do not share parts while apparently there is continuity between them, realized by the functioning of my body. To take an example that is closer to our topic, it seems that there is a discontinuity between the region occupied by the trap invoked earlier and the region of the forest even though, from the purely topographical perspective, the trap is located in the forest. And that is why the trapped animal is *contained* in the trap, *not* in the forest anymore.

Hence, what we need is the notions of *boundary* and *connection*. They are studied formally by the discipline dubbed *mereotopology* by Smith (1996) as it combines the theory of parthood, i.e., mereology, with a bunch of topics borrowed from topology (see also Varzi 2007). I take the relation "x is a boundary for y" as the third given here. So, I assume that we all understand what it means that there is a boundary (or boundaries) dividing the table and the book, but also a boundary (or boundaries) dividing water in the Atlantic and the air above it, or one(s) dividing the water and the body of a fish in it.

However, continuity does not necessarily mean that there is no boundary between two entities, and discontinuity does not boil down to there being a boundary. Note that there is a boundary between parts of my jacket, e.g., between sleeves and the rest of it, but they are continuous, and the continuity in question is provided precisely by a specific kind of boundary which is referred to in ordinary speech as a *sew*. On the other hand, we can hardly think of any sharply delineated boundary between a swarm of bees and a flock of birds when the two accidentally mixed in the air, but there's no continuity between them. So, we need also a notion of connection to unpack continuity and discontinuity. According to the definition we find in the relevant literature x and y are connected if they share a part or a boundary. They are *externally* connected iff they share a boundary, but no other parts. And they are *remotely* connected iff there is such z, that x is connected or externally connected to z and z is connected or externally connected to y.

However, we can also find approaches (e.g., Varzi 2007) taking connection as a primitive, not derivative notion. This is a reasonable strategy at least when we take into account our usual manner of thinking. It was already singled out by Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987) that the idea of connection was among the most significant imaginary schemas capturing the manifest image and in the era of the Internet this intuitive grasp can only be broadened so that it covers cases that can hardly be categorized in terms of sharing parts or boundaries. For example, there is a sense in which my computer is *connected to the global network* in spite of

the fact that it does not seem to share any parts or boundaries (what it would mean in this context - that's a thing deserving a separate discussion) with other members of that web.

Now, drawing on the intuitive richness of the idea of connection as well as on the already assumed notions of boundary and part, I would like to propose the concept that may be articulated, provisionally, in the following way:

(2) x and y are *functionally* connected if their boundaries are defined in such a way that they can play some *roles* as parts of a fixed *system*.

To take some obvious example, I do not share any parts with a hammer, yet the surface of my body and the surface of the hammer are such that I can use it as a tool, which makes us functionally connected.

The domain of functional connections is broad enough to accommodate the more standard cases of sharing parts and boundaries. Hence, I assume that if any two entities share a part or a boundary, it has, by definition, a functional aspect, too. However, not all functional connections boil down to the cases of sharing parts or boundaries.

Now, when it comes to the functional factors engaged in *containment*, it becomes clear that the purely extensional language employed by available formal theories of location and mereotopologies is not up to the task insofar as the task at stake requires an articulation of the Occlusion condition. Hence, I add one more thing to the conceptual framework rolled out here. Namely, it is assumed for the purposes of this study that objects populating the manifest image of the world can act upon each other, make changes, have an impact on each other. Therefore, it may be beneficial to refer to a notion bearing some similarity to the concept of *power* as it appeared in the seminal book by G. Molnar (2003). We read:

..........Molnar (...)

Now, what I have in mind is a specific kind of power. It might be referred to as the power *to make something possible*. However, it is not a possibility in the purely logical sense (in which either something is possible, meaning non-contradictory, or not, full stop) but rather a sense that is a mix of the metaphysical and the practical factors. Here one entity creates or contributes to the creation of such *conditions* in which some other entity can come into being. For example, I can give my child some amount of money thereby making a variety of purchases possible, but I don't make any of these purchases actual (it's up to my daughter if she buys a book or a beer, or buys nothing and keeps the money). Making something possible means here *setting a stage for something's coming into being*. Hence, making something possible is similar to what .. called *enabling* in his analyzes of causality. It could be said that things in the manifest image have the *power to enable* specific processes or events. Note,

however, that we can also single out the opposite relation of *making something impossible*, thus *disabling,* and while enabling is rather weak, the other one is quite strong. It means creating or contributing to the creation of such conditions in which something remains a logical possibility, but is very unlikely to come into being. Hence, it is not about blocking an individual occurrence of a given entity, event or action at a given moment, e.g., when a policeman is stemming the criminal's actions. Instead, it's about setting up such environment in which certain actions are impossible or highly unlikely (think of gun laws, to take the most politically pregnant example, when compared to the individual policeman's bravery). To consider a different case, I can take all the money from my child as a punishment, thereby making all purchases impossible (suppose there is no other way to get the money).

So, I take here the modal relations "x makes y possible (enables y)" and "x makes y impossible (disables y)" for granted.

Finally, employing the naive metaphysical framework rolled out above, we obtain the following two concepts:

(3) Absolute containment (hereafter AC) is when x encompasses y, and for any z, x makes y's functional connection with z impossible.

Perhaps AC is never actually the case in nature as one can hardly imagine such an absolute cut off. However, one might suspect that AC aptly describes the Cartesian version of the mind-as-a-place model. I'll come back to this case later on.

(4) Relative containment (hereafter RC) is when x encompasses y, and there is z such that x makes y's functional connection with z impossible.

One more thing that has to be accounted for in the proposed ontological terms is the Replacement condition, i.e., the fact that a contained x, once it becomes contained by y, finds itself in a different environment, even if the location of x is part of the location of y. The example of the trap is telling in this context. An apt way to unpack this phenomenon is by stipulating that containment is a nontransitive relation, meaning that if x contains (in any of the listed senses) y, and y contains z, then x does not contain z. So, going back to the example, the animal is contained in the trap, the trap is contained in the forest (suppose the forest can be thought of as a container is a more liberalized sense), but the animal is not contained in the forest anymore.

The stipulation just made opposes Johnson (1987) who puts stress upon the claim that containment is transitive (see also Lakoff 1987). Someone might argue that my setting of the issue is counterintuitive: If I have a toy contained in a box, and the box is contained in my apartment, then it is hardly intuitive to say that the toy is not contained in my apartment.

However, we have to keep in minds that containment is a particular instantiation of encompassment and do not conflate these two. Encompassment is transitive, and this fact is spelled out in the example just given. Hence, if the toy is contained in the box and the box is contained in the apartment, then plainly the toy is encompassed by the apartment, but not necessarily contained there. And this is the case due to the functional factors which are not singled out by Johnson (1987) and require the mentioned additions to the extensional language of the theories of location proposed by Perzanowski (1993) and Casati & Varzi (1999). Containment brings the power to make specific connections impossible and the point in rendering it nontransitive is that once the power is exercised on the toy by the box, e.g., the former makes the latter's functional connections with the child impossible, it makes no sense to say that the apartment exercise this power still on the toy, too. The box is enough to do the job, as it were if one wants to hide the toy from the child.

Minds as containers

It seems that the bucket theory of mind does satisfy the conditions of AC insofar as the mind is considered there not just as a different section or part of reality, but as a genuinely different realm, substance or "space." However, the optimistic conclusion that the job of unpacking the bucket theory is done would be too hasty, meaning that we need some more work if the core idea of the bucket theory is to be outlined. First, note that the kinds of containment distinguished in the previous section draw on what I propose to call the *prototypical sense* of containment. The latter is best exemplified by such cases as toys hidden in boxes, so that if x contains y, then y's boundary is a physical barrier, x and y exist independently of each other; therefore x *in principle could be located outside* y.

Yet, it is hardly acceptable that minds are prototypical containers. Namely, items that are targeted by the bucket theory as contained in mind *cannot in principle be elsewhere*. In other words, minds are not delineated by material barriers which can be crossed by certain stuff going back and forth. Note that AC and RC make the functional connection of the contained entities impossible, but it may be the case for a limited period, not in principle. Once the entities leave the container, they are free to set up connections, and - crucially - *the very idea of leaving the container* makes sense in AC and RC while, certainly, it would make no sense concerning the mind thought of as a container.

Meanwhile, it seems that the bucket theory of mind has it that a contained item is constituted by its container: thoughts or ideas in someone's mind *are what they are* due to

their location. Instead of introducing a new primitive, we can make use of those already set and speak of the *constitutive* sense of containment:

(5) Constitutive containment (CC) of x by y is a situation in which y contains x, y makes x possible, and the lack of y makes x impossible.

In this context, it seems that the birthmark of the bucket theory is that it targets the mind as an absolute *and constitutive* container. Note that (5) leaves open the possibility that x requires some additional factors to come into being, not only the container y, yet (5) guarantees that however critical these other constraints are, if y did not contain x, x couldn't come into being. Note that even those who oppose Descartes' nativism, e.g., empiricists such as Locke or Hume, and insist that without external stimuli there is no mental entity, can still adhere to the main idea at stake, stipulating that this entity's *very being mental* requires that the entity is impossible outside the mind. Hence - according to Descartes *as well as* Locke and Hume, the mind is in principle a constitutive container.

However, there still remains one feature of the bucket theory that needs a proper articulation. Namely, the fact that a thing's being mental cannot be partial: once it is mind-dependent, it is *wholly* mind-dependent. It is this feature of the bucket theory that makes it utterly unthinkable that some *aspects* of things are mind-dependent, while other aspects or properties are mind-independent. And this is the reason why the bucket theory has a difficult time trying to address such figures as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty or Varela who openly speak of mind-*dependent* aspects (remember of the two-aspect reading of Kant in this context, too; see Alison...) of genuinely mind-*independent* entities.

Hence, I propose to distinguish:

(6) *Full* constitutive containment (FCC) of x is a situation in which x's containment in y is constitutive for all proper parts of x.

(7) *Partial* constitutive containment (PCC) of x is a situation in which x's containment in y is constitutive for some proper parts of x.

Tyler & Evans (2003) distinguish the in-situ sense of "in", articulated in such sentences as "I'm in prison" or "I'm in hospital", where the stress is put upon the fact the containment is a more robust condition. Robustness means here that for some reason it is impossible for the contained entity to leave the container. In my reading the in-situ sense articulates PCC. The containment's being a more robust condition boils down to the fact that the location constitutes a certain novel part or parts of the contained entity at stake. As for the example given, when my friend John is in prison, we can hardly say that John *as such* is constituted by his unhappy location, but there is an *aspect* of John (a "moment" in Husserl's terminology; see

Simons 1987 on that issue), e.g., his *being a prisoner*, that is constituted by the location at stake.

Finally, here is the sought articulation of the bucket theory:

(8) <u>The bucket theory of mind (BTM)</u>: the mind is an absolute and fully-constitutive container.

As mentioned before, BTM is a particular, but surely not the only embodiment of the mind-as-a-place paradigm. The latter can now be unpacked as making a relatively mild stipulation:

(9) <u>The-mind-*as*-place paradigm</u>: the mind is such an entity that something else can be encompassed by it.

Some more intuition pumps and situational containment

There is, however, much room within the mind-as-a-place paradigm minus BTM. To see that, let us go back to Tyler & Evans (2003) for a moment and some other derivative senses of "in" distinguished by them. We can treat them as intuition pumps (in the sense of Dennett....).

The first is called the *State Sense*, and it refers to the location in a state or in a situation (Johnson 1989; Grady 1997; Lakoff and Johnson 1999), e.g., "I'm in pain"; "We are in a state of war." The TR is in some sense bounded, meaning that its actions are somehow constrained, but this is the case not because of some straightforward physical barrier, e.g., a wall. The TR's actions are constrained by circumstances, as it were, thus by certain arrangements of things surrounding the TR, including the TR itself. The second is called the *Shape As Boundary Sense*, e.g., when a teacher calls "Ok, class, put your chairs in a circle!". Here the TR participates in establishing the boundaries of LM, thus in establishing LM itself. Therefore, as in the state sense, here too, being bounded and constrained is understood in a much more abstract sense, referring not to actual barriers that are numerically different from the TR, but to the way in which the TR is related to other things.

Both of these cases are exemplifications of what I would like to call *situational* containment. There is no room for a detailed elaboration of the concept of situation itself (see Barwise & Perry...; Wolniewicz...;...). Let us suppose that a situation or a state of affair is defined as a triple composed of a fixed set of objects, a fixed set of relations binding them, and a fixed set of moments in time. The latter indicates that the whole structure is dynamic. For example, there is a situation referred to as "John is sitting at his kitchen table" but some more complex or even extremely complex situations, or clusters of situations and dynamic states of affairs can be referred to as, e.g., the Vienna Congress or the Napoleon Wars.

Now, Tyler and Evans make, in my view, a plausible point that in some cases we can speak of being engaged in a situation in terms of containment. This is because situations can actually establish a division between entities embroiled in them and those that are not embroiled (Segmentation); they can block functional connections between the former and the latter (Occlusion); thereby establishing a relatively new environment for the former (Replacement).

So, the core of the situational containment is the idea that things taking part in a situation constitute for themselves a boundary or boundaries that *in turn* contain them. The example of the Napoleon Wars is perhaps not so appealing, but imagine a much more straightforward situation of conflict, e.g., a street fight resulting from a group of criminals attacking you as you are going back home at night. Suddenly, the newly emerged relations, undoubtedly unpleasant ones, between you and the group of attackers create an invisible boundary of the situation in which you got unwillingly embroiled. These boundaries block your functional connections with possibly useful entities outside the situation, thereby bringing forth a new, dangerous environment for you, in spite of the fact that from the properly topographical standpoint you are still on the very same street as before.

Therefore I propose:

(10) Situational containment (hereafter SC): x situationally contains y iff the conditions of either AC or RC are satisfied for x and y, x is a situation, y is part of x, and x is made possible in part by y.

Is there a way of thinking of the mind as a situational container? Here being-in-the-mind would mean being in some unique relations, or in some specific arrangement; the mind itself would be rather a situation than a substance or entity. I leave this option open due to the lack of space, yet my final proposal draws on it to some extent.

Frames

It is somewhat striking that Tyler & Evans (2003) do not say a single word about a perfectly intuitive instantiation of "in" standing out in such sentences as, e.g., "In light of what you said, I would recommend...". The phrase "in (the) light of" is usually used to underline the fact that one issue or entity presents itself thus and so through the lens of other fixed entity or issue. Now, being "in the light of" is not about occlusion and obscuring access; on the contrary - it is all about *exposing* the entity, making it *accessible*, as opposed to the state of being in the dark, thus being inaccessible.

Perhaps the reason why Tyler & Evans neglect the "in the light" cases has to do with the fact that the latter hardly fit the proto-scene for "in." However, abandoning the proto-scene would cost too much. It has a clear architecture which can be nicely captured using certain formal-ontological tools, and hence there is no point in giving it up. However, there is one intriguing instantiation of "in" that satisfies the "geometry" of the proto-scene and at the same time does justice to the core of the "in the light of" case, stressing exposition instead of occlusion. I mean the case whose prototypical instantiations can be found in each home, cabinet, not to mention galleries and museums: I mean *frames*.

Now, instead of thinking of paintings encrusted with gold, and instead of thinking of your family pictures, think of the following setting. Imagine a wall covered with little graffiti - letters and signatures. There are lots of them so that it is hardly possible to discern a particular graffiti and differentiate it from the rest. But suppose that there is a rationale for distinguishing just one, say because it was made by a famous artist. Likely the best way to do that is to take a simple rectangle of a suitable size, made of wood, plastic or whatever one wishes, and to place it on the wall so that it encloses or fences the desired signature. The signature is still on the wall, it has not been cut off from it, yet now the attention of the viewers is *directed* by the frame and *led to* the signature. Note that the attention is not attracted by the frame but *led by it* while the frame itself or its role remains, in a sense, tacit. As a result, it is perfectly fine to say *the signature* attracts the attention via the frame. The frame is then all about making the framed entity exposed, visible, accessible.

Hence, I propose to make use of the locative terminology introduced above in the following way:

(11) Universal framing (hereafter UF) is when x encompasses y, and for any z, x makes y's functional connection with z possible.

Analogously as in AC, one might argue that UF is never actually the case in nature as one can hardly imagine a scenario in which there is a frame for a fixed x making x accessible to *any* entity in the universe, thus making x's connections with any other entity possible. Still, singling out this conceptually thinkable option is justified insofar as it is not proven impossible in principle (perhaps Berkeley had such absolute framing in mind when he referred to God who perceived everything in one glimpse).

(12) Relative framing (hereafter RF) is when x encompasses y, and there is z (different from y and different from x) such that x makes y's functional connection with z possible.

Someone might argue that the appeal to frames is, in a sense, conservative, as even institutions that used to employ them a lot, like galleries and museums, can hardly do this

when it comes to modern art, meaning installations, performances, etc. There is no frame needed when it comes to Marcel Duchamp's "Fountain," not to mention "The Gates" designed by Cristo and Jeanne-Claude. Therefore, someone might argue that the range of applications of the concept of frame is too narrow to be philosophically interesting.

This argument gives me a chance to articulate the point that the category at stake is far more abstract than the initial example suggests. So, following containment, we should distinguish between prototypical cases of framing, such as the example just given, and derivative senses. As a result, framing a given entity can mean establishing a situation, not necessarily a place, strictly speaking, in which the entity is delineated, exposed or highlighted in some manner. Therefore it is made accessible there.

Let us stay in the domain of arts for a moment. Drawing on Arthur Danto's (1964) idea of the artworld, George Dickie defined a work of art as an artifact "on which some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the artworld) has conferred the status of candidate for appreciation" (Dickie 1971: 101). In my reading, conferring the status of a work of art on a given x can be nicely unpacked as imposing a particular frame on x. This means that x, e.g., one of Duchamp's "readymades", is being picked up from a variety of entities, exposed or presented in a particular context, situation or circumstance, so that a new "story" can be told about x (a job done by artists, curators, critics or viewers). At the end of the day, Duchamp's urinal and Cristo and Jeanne-Claude's constructions in Central Park must have been somehow "selected" or "captured," thus framed by certain institutions *to come about as works of art*. Otherwise, the urinal would have been just *a* urinal. Note that the two conditions of framing plus the "geometry" of the proto-scene are indeed satisfied here: the entities in question have been selected (Segmentation). Therefore certain bounded "space" or rather a situation or arrangement have been delineated (even though the boundaries are fuzzy) where the attention of viewers should be directed. And finally, most importantly, the selected entities have been precisely in that space exposed or *brought to view* (Exposition) as "candidates for appreciation".

Hence, we can introduce the following notions departing from the prototypical case and rendering framing more abstract, in step with the already set distinctions between different derivative senses of containment:

(13) Situational framing (SF): x situationally frames y iff (i) the conditions of either FR or AF are satisfied by x and y; (ii) x is a situation and y is part of x; (iii) y makes (usually together with other parts of x) the boundary of x possible.

(14) Constitutive framing (CF) a situation in which x frames y; being framed by x makes y possible, and the lack of x makes y impossible.

(15) Full constitutive framing (FCF) is a situation in which framing is constitutive for all proper parts of the framed entity.

(16) Partial constitutive framing (PCF) is a situation in which framing is constitutive for some proper parts of the framed entity.

I am not sure whether there are cases of FCF, yet there are lots of instances of PCF. Think of Duchamp's sink again. Situational framing brought forth by appropriate institutions is partly constitutive for the *Fountain*, meaning that it constitutes the sink *qua the Fountain*. In other words, while the *Fountain* inherits likely all the properties of the "material" of which it has been "made" (these two terms must have some nonstandard sense in this particular context, of course), it is also, in part, constituted by the situational frame imposed by the artworld. The sink's *being a work of art*, particularly it's *being the Fountain* is constituted by the frame. But take an entirely different example: a portion (still changing) of water's *being the Atlantic Ocean* is also constituted by the situational - in this case *institutional* - frame (the frame provided by institutions, broadly construed, responsible for geographical fiats such as *Europe* and *Asia* which are, in reality, placed on the same piece of land). Yet, of course, the water itself is not constituted by any frame.