

Seweryn Blandzi,

Aristotle's *Prote Philosophia* as Methodology

The term "first philosophy" became popular, because of Aristotelian Metaphysics, where it is associated particularly with the knowledge of the first principles and causes. In relation to other kinds of knowledge, it would play a regulative role as *archikotera* and even *archikotate ton epistemon*. In the sixth book (E) of Metaphysics, the aporetic question is raised, and it concerns the honor of being "the first" –whether it is to be attributed to the knowledge of some particular and specific kind of subject matter, because of its exceptional ontic status, or whether it is to be attributed to the most general ability that has universal value. In the first case, *to ariston en te physei pase* would be regarded as most noble for its gravity deserves, which would have to exceed everything in the nature. In the second, one could call it the "first" ability due to its range of application.

From the book Epsilon it does not follow that the *timiotaton genos* (=to *theion*) should dethrone *to on he on* as the only legitimate subject of the first philosophy. The major problem of the Epsilon is the primacy of philosophy understood as the very first of the abilities (explaining the beings/things/facts distributively), and not due to its being some "supra-philosophy", but rather due to the universality of its method. Aristotle understood the priority of the (first) philosophy as the proper first wisdom (*sophia*), as a special ability of dealing with any subject matter of knowledge. In Aristotle, the role of the unifying factor is played by the formal approach, identical in each case, providing exhaustive ultimate explanations, namely, asking the same questions about the essential, final, material and efficient causality. Pointing to the causes of anything is tantamount to its explanation and justification, "an explanation in all the possible meaning in which something can be explained (E. Berti)". Thus, philosophy is the first one, because the principles and causes (ontologically) precede being, as (logically), within the order of knowledge, the explanatory reasons are first; the situation is exactly the same as in logic where explanans logically precedes explanandum.

In brief, being familiar with the cause-and-effect nexus (aitiology) is discovering of the truth, namely, the wisdom and knowledge, including the art of definition of essences of things (ousiology), because in the structure of being *ousia* is also that which is the first.

Patrick Trompiz

Res et spes/ Od Rzeczpospolitej do rzeczy pospolitych

My paper is an extract of the argument of my PHD in progress. My thesis argues that the historical passage from pre-Socratic to post-Socratic philosophy represents a loss of deeper meaning of 'wisdom' represented by the pre-Socratics.

In the case of Aristotle, I argue that logical and linguistic considerations heavily influence the choice of paradigms of objects – the examples of things which serve as paradigms. In both his logical and his metaphysical considerations, Aristotle misses the significance of fictional entities, for example. Aristotle's logic emerges, I argue, above all out of an 'enlightenment' culture of clarity and public accountability. And his weaknesses are those of the modern European enlightenment, positivism and analytic philosophy with whom he shares the bias for public accountability. Hence the *res publica*. Socrates began this process crucially with his 'Odyssey' literally around the streets of Athens, paradoxically meeting his nemesis, Parmenides, right at the beginning of his adventures. Paradigmatic objects in Aristotle are crucially of two major kinds – biological organisms and so-called 'medium sized dry goods' in Austin's famous phrase. I argue that the choice of these paradigms influences Aristotle's metaphysics including the difficulties it has.

Andrzej Wiercinski,

Hermeneutic Belonging to Tradition: Between Remembering and Forgetting

This paper examines the reciprocal relationship between remembering and forgetting and the possibility of the past's being made present again with reference to Paul Ricoeur's, *Memory, History, Forgetting*. Ricoeur situates his philosophy of history in-between the mastery of memory and the force of forgetting. A human being as *l'homme capable* is capable of talking, narrating, acting, making him/herself responsible, and of making memory and making history. In a phenomenological approach to memory and mnemonic phenomena, Ricoeur addresses the question of how a memory in the present can be of something absent, the past. In the spirit of Husserlian phenomenology, Ricoeur investigates two issues: 'Of what are there memories?' and "Whose memory is it?" Following the Husserlian distinction between "the noesis of remembering and the noema of memories," Ricoeur offers his phenomenological sketch of memory, linking the preverbal or lived experience (Husserl's *Erlebnis*) with

phenomenological hermeneutics (which Ricoeur calls “phenomenology on the path of interpretation.” Ricoeur heavily relies on Husserl's distinction between “retention or primary memory and reproduction or secondary memory.” In Ricoeur's interpretation of Husserl's “Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time,” the famous epoche, which, for Husserl, results in bracketing objective time “does not begin by laying bare a pure flow, but rather a temporal experience (Erfahrung) that has an object-oriented side in memory.” By addressing the issue of temporal duration, Ricoeur makes meaningful a distinction between “immediate memory or retention and secondary memory (recollection) or reproduction.” Since the object of intention endures temporally, what is being retained is immediately altered by the “ever new now” This “modification” signifies that “to endure is to remain the same.” Ricoeur quotes Husserl to stress that “a new now is always entering on the scene, the now changes into a past; and as it does so the whole running-off continuity of pasts belonging to the preceding points moves ‘downwards’ uniformly into the depths of the past.” Criticizing Husserl's presuppositions in his phenomenology of time (which was supposed to be suppositionless and open solely to the “things themselves”), Ricoeur points that epoche “under the guise of objectification, strikes worldliness.”

Forgiveness, by constituting the joint horizon for memory, history, and forgetting, “places a seal of incompleteness on the entire enterprise,” but also casts the new light on the difficult subject of reconciliation in history. Ricoeur prepares the ground for an eschatological representation of the past thus avoiding an apocalyptic tone in his philosophical hermeneutics. “What is at stake is the projection of a sort of eschatology of memory and, in its wake, of history and of forgetting.” Ricoeur emphasizes the link between memory and narrative identity: memory is often falsified through the detour of narrative, “slipping back into the traps amnesty-amnesia,” which constitutes *ars oblivionis* (art of forgetting). The selective side of story-telling creates a problem for historical truth. With regard to forgiveness, Ricoeur speaks of the strategy of elusion and evasion, which is carefully worked out to protect the self against the return of unbearable memories. Not always a felicitous human faculty, forgiveness is therefore not only an ability and a burdensome task. Rather, in his analysis of the faculty of forgiveness, Ricoeur pushes “the odyssey of forgiveness to the center of selfhood.” Forgiveness is the vertical dimension of “*ily a le pardon*,” which emphasizes the significant asymmetry between the power to forgive and the power to promise (horizontal correlation). For Ricoeur, “forgiveness has the effect of dissociating the debt from its burden of guilt and in a sense of laying bare the phenomenon of the debt, as the dependence on a received heritage ... it should release the agent from his act.” This essential possibility of separating the agent from his or her action (hate the sin and love the sinner) should create a culture of forgiveness. The arrival of forgiveness is beyond human power. The offer of forgiveness is free and can

not be taken for granted: it restores the human being to the capacity of acting and action to the capacity of continuing: the unbinding of the agent from his or her act marks "the inscription, in the field of horizontal disparity between power and act, of the vertical disparity between the great height of forgiveness and the abyss of guilt. The guilty person, rendered capable of beginning again: this would be the figure of unbinding that commands all the others."

The perspective of an appeased memory is associated with forgiveness: the recognition of the past remembered without anger and prejudices. By emphasizing the fact that the relation between memory, history and forgetting is closed upon itself prior to the epilogue, Ricoeur opens up the question of a hermeneutic reading of his own work. As a philosopher who insisted that existence itself is essentially hermeneutic he could hardly avoid endorsing the ideal of an ever-developing interpretation of himself. Ricoeur's is a truly polysemic voice, sacrificing neither truth nor variety. His voice has been true to the confused medley of voices that constitutes the tradition that we are.

Krzysztof Jakubczak

Zarzut nihilizmu wobec myśli buddyjskiej

Zarzut nihilizmu stawiany jest myśli buddyjskiej od chwili sformułowania jej podstawowych przekonań przez Siddharthę Gautamę. O nihilizm buddyzm, jak i poszczególne buddyjskie szkoły, oskarżany był przez myślicieli bramińskich. Zarzut ten powrócił także w XIX w. w środowisku filozofów europejskich. Formułowali go zarówno myśliciele religijni związani z tradycją chrześcijańską, badacze buddyzmu, jak też i myśliciele kontestujący utrwalone w kulturze europejskiej formy myślenia realistycznego. Wśród tych ostatnich wskazać należy przede wszystkim F. Nietzschego. Ze zdwojoną siłą zarzut ten powrócił pod koniec XX w. adresowany do szkoły madhjamaki.

Chociaż zarzut nihilizmu przekraczał bariery epok i kultur, to w dużym stopniu wyrastał z podobnych ontologicznych przesłanek. W referacie zamierzam owe przesłanki wskazać i ocenić ich obiektywny, a tym samym uniwersalny charakter.

Kamila Najdek,

Z życia pojęć. Terminy techniczne między opisem filozoficznym a refleksją literacką

W wystąpieniu chciałam zapytać o przechodzenie pojęć konstruowanych na potrzeby opisu filozoficznego do kultury powszechnej (ale nie pop kultury!!!), albo inaczej: co się dzieje, kiedy terminy, które powstają po to, aby uchwycić jakiś stan rzeczy, samą rzecz czy ideę, służą do autodefinicji pewnych ugrupowań, stają się jakimś jednoczącym hasłem, raczej symbolem niż sposobem zbliżania się do prawdy. Analiza, jaką chciałam zaproponować, nie ma charakteru językoznawczego, tylko estetyczny. Posłużę się tekstem stosunkowo niedawno wydanej powieści "Rot" niemieckiego autora Uwe Timma - poniekąd filozofa z wykształcenia -, który z perspektywy współczesnej śledzi losy zbuntowanej generacji lat sześćdziesiątych i pyta, jak przekuła ona swoje hasła na praktykę późniejszego życia. Wiodącym myślicielem jest tu Walther Benjamin. Myślę, że szczególnie dla filozofów kultury jest to tekst godny uwagi, bo skonstruowany jest jako palimpsest na historiozoficznych tezach Benjaminina i posługuje się podobną metaforą; poza tym jest bardzo piękny.

Adam Drozdek

Grigorii Teplov as a popularizer of philosophy

In 1751, Grigorii Teplov published his book that he considered to be an introduction to philosophy for the uninitiated. In the first part, Teplov introduced the reader to the subject of philosophy; however, Teplov concentrated on philosophy and methodology of science, thereby presenting a rather limited view of philosophy. In the second part, he presented the history of philosophy showing how inadequate his knowledge of the subject was. In the third part, he discussed some ontological and epistemological problems when in his presentation of several philosophical concepts basing his presentation largely on Wolff.

Wojciech Starzyński

Jean-Luc Marion, et son interprétation de *aitia/aitiata* à partir de Denys l'Aréopagite

Dans "L'idole et la distance", Jean-Luc Marion mène une analyse sur les termes de la métaphysique classique *aitia/aitiata* qui, dans le langage philosophique sont rendu traditionnellement

comme paire bien connue, celle de cause / effets. Dans le cadre de l'analyse des textes de Denys Aréopagite, Marion tente de restaurer la richesse de sens contenue dans ces termes et oublié dans le cours de l'histoire. Ainsi, dans le contexte du discours de la louange de Denys, la cause devient le Réquisit que les requérants louent en en faisant une requête. Le sens de cette requête qu'il faut entendre comme la demande, au sens d'une prière, se trouve ensuite complété par un sens juridique du terme selon lequel les requérants font appel, mettent devant le tribunal le Réquisit.

Marzenna Jakubczak

The role of memory on the path towards self-knowledge according to the most ancient philosophical schools of India

The issue of psychophysical integrity of human being finds several interesting articulations in the classical Indian philosophical texts, including these of Sāṃkhya-Yoga tradition. A highly debatable question remains, however, where the self, the subject of perception and volition is located, since the principle of consciousness is said to be embedded neither in body nor in mind. To define the epistemic status of the rudimentary self-representation I will discuss in detail how the memory traces of the past deeds (saṃskāra), focused attention (ekāgratā) and the ability to distinguish between 'I' and non-'I' (vivekakhyaṭi) mutually condition one another according to Sāṃkhya and Yoga thinkers. While doing so, I will also refer to some contemporary studies of the cognitive, emotional and volitional functions developed thanks to attention regulation and monitoring meditation.

Robert Karul

Le commentaire du Traité 29 "Sur la vue" de Plotin

La conception de la vision sensuelle de Plotin paraît hanter quelques-uns des penseurs phénoménologiques. H. Maldiney le cite dans son "Esquisse de l'esthétique phénoménologique" et les idées plotiniennes lui permettent de développer sa propre position, R. Barbaras cite dans son "Le désir et la distance" souvent J. Patočka, mais il arrive de temps en temps que des idées de Patočka sont des idées de Plotin dans les habits langagiers actuels. On n'aspire pas à expliquer cette actualité phénoménologique de Plotin ni la documenter en détail. Mais motivé par elle, on voudrait relire son traité pour dégager les éléments intéressants au-delà des écoles.

Jan Zozulak

Current research Byzantine philosophy

In the recent years, more attention is paid to the examination of Byzantine philosophy that prevailed in the new historical conditions and creatively inspired later philosophers. Significantly, Byzantine studies (so called Byzantology) which were created as a separate historical discipline helped to that process and Byzantine studies were focused on the study of Byzantine history, languages and arts, but they have not been focused on the study of Byzantine philosophy. The milestone in the study of Byzantine philosophy and the first systematic work in this area was the monograph of V. Tatakis *Byzantine philosophy*, in which Byzantine philosophy was synthetically introduced and systematically analysed as a continuation of Greek philosophy during the period of the Eastern (Byzantine) Empire. The development of Byzantine philosophy is linked with the names of other prominent scholars at the end of the 20th century who dedicated their work to this new scientific discipline: K. Oehler, P. Lemerle, G. Podskalsky, G. N. Wilson, H. Hunger, L. Benakis, N. Matsoukas and others who critically examined Byzantine philosophical texts in recent decades and made great progress in research. In the history of philosophy, Byzantine philosophy is irreplaceable; therefore an increased attention is paid to the research also in the Slavic academic environment.

Małgorzata Przanowska

Dialogos, dihairesis, diagnosis. Dialectic primacy of listening, the sense of taste and two rationalities

The paper begins with a short analysis of the excerpt of Plato's Republic, book 7, devoted to the process of educating a dialectician. This starting point is to be enriched by a reference to Aristotle's dialectic of listening and by Heraclitus' formula of the listening to *logos*. The issue of differentiation and recognition will be presented then in connection with Plato's concept of beauty. Beauty is of great importance in the concept of cognition (understood as a dialogic recognition) and it resides as well (however not always *expressis verbis*) in Aristotle's practical wisdom (*phronesis*).

Yet, in the Enlightenment the phronetic tradition - carried on in the concept of taste not reduced to the aesthetic area - is replaced with the imperative philosophy (Kant). The main thesis of the paper is that in the philosophy the dialectic of listening (previously connected with judgment and a way of being) is reduced to the obedience to the law of the transcendental reason. Consequently, „free will” expresses itself in the power of its inclination or the obedience to the reason. The problem is that the obedience

has nothing in common with the listening out for *logos*, although the will becomes the center of a decision-making process (or an act). The elimination of taste understood as the sense of phonetic (re)cognition (*diagnosis*) steals a change of rationality's paradigm, and as a result, it grounds the instrumentalization of thinking (understanding) and its reduction to the calculative-use dimension.

Thus, human being begins to be considered as rational existence, however this rationality is - in a sense - deprived of *logos*. In this context the hermeneutic formulation "searching for words from within language" ceases to be merely the expression of the hermeneutic dialectic. It is a contemporary proposition of another "rationality". Human being cannot be interpreted only as a biological, psychological or sociological individual straggling with the moral imperative. It seems it is possible now to understand human being as a *sensu plenus* akouological reality – the experience of listening.

W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz

Happiness and three Dimensions of Reality

There are some philosophical schools coming from the East that deny real existence to the observable world and regard it as an illusion. According to their view, the world we observe is unreal and the only reality is the eternal spirit or pure consciousness. On the other hand, there are some philosophical schools coming from the West that reduce the reality to the world and the world to the totality of facts. There is no other reality but the observable, material world. The schools described above both represent a one-sided view of the reality. They define the reality as either facts or the spirit. In this paper I propose a different view. Reality is a multilevel manifold. The facts that we can observe and the consciousness that we can experience are just two of its dimensions. We need to add one more—values and perhaps some additional dimensions, like time, can still be added.

Our world is not an illusion, nor should it be associated with sorrow. We have come to this world to be happy and, we do not need to liberate ourselves from it. To pursue spiritual fulfillment does not mean that we should focus on our inner self that is consciousness and neglect other dimensions of reality. They all complement and mutually influence each other.

Adam Olech

W sprawie pewnego fragmentu z *Traktatu* Dawida Hume'a

Są w *Traktacie* Dawida Hume'a oraz w jego *Badaniach* takie słowa, które nawet po latach, kiedy się je ponownie czyta, nic nie tracą ze swej ważności, mimo że niegdysiejsze doznanie związane z ich odkrywczością mogło zatracić swą dawną żywość. Te słowa dotyczą przeświadczenia o fakcie, czyli o rzeczywistym istnieniu przedmiotu przeświadczenia. Oto one:

Ta operacja umysłu, która towarzyszy przeświadczeniu o jakimś fakcie, była dotychczas, jak się zdaje, jedną z największych tajemnic filozofii, choć nikt nawet nie podejrzewał, że zachodzi jakaś trudność jej wyjaśnienia. Co do mnie, to muszę przyznać, że widzę tu znaczną trudność, i że nawet wówczas, gdy myślę, iż rozumiem sprawę dokładnie, jestem w kłopotcie, w jakich terminach wyjaśnić to, co mam na myśli (*Traktat*, s. 181).

Użyte w tym fragmencie słowo „przeświadczenie” (belief) jest jedynym, jakie ów filozof znajduje, aby nazwać trudno opisywalny, a do tamtej pory przez nikogo niewyjaśniony rezultat uprzedniego zetknięcia się umysłu z faktem. I kiedy następnie poszukuje innych słów, aby przy ich pomocy móc bliżej określić ideę przeświadczenia – wszak przeświadczenie jest ideą, a nie impresją, wówczas konstatuje swoją w tym względzie bezradność. Mówi, wysuwając własną w tym względzie hipotezę, że jej specyficzność polega na takim *sposobie występowania* jej w umyśle, na takim *sposobie jej pojmowania*, który sprawia, że jest ideą silną, ugruntowaną i stałą, dzięki czemu to, co jest jej przedmiotem, jest pojmowane jako realne i jest tym samym dla podmiotu bardziej aktualne aniżeli fikcja.

Przedmiotem referatu jest analiza tego właśnie, przytoczonego fragmentu, w kontekście filozoficznych poglądów Hume'a, a następnie w kontekście filozoficznych poglądów Franza Brentana, Kazimierza Twardowskiego, Jana Łukasiewicza, Edmunda Husserla i Romana Ingardena.

David Černín

Should we consider History of Philosophy to be Historical Science?

The first aim of this paper is to briefly introduce concept of historical sciences as a specific human endeavour focused on interpreting present data in order to get some limited insight into the past. It will be shown that many different sciences and disciplines, like cosmogony, geology, comparative linguistics or evolutionary biology, share similar obstacles and methods, which they employ, to certain degree. The second part of this paper will try to answer the question whether history of philosophy

belongs among these historical disciplines and sciences. It will list similarities and differences regarding various methods and approaches to history of philosophy and will try to deduce possible limits of such inquiry. We may consider history of philosophy to be very specific member of this diverse group of historical disciplines, we may learn a lot from other historical sciences and we must use our knowledge of philosophy in order to identify the subject of our interest. This very combination of historical and philosophical knowledge constitutes what we call history of philosophy.

Lukáš Lička

Four or Five Causes? Peter Olivi on the Terminative Causality

The presentation introduces a peculiar medieval attempt to reconsider the traditional Aristotelian classification of four causes. According to some medieval philosophers (13th century Franciscan thinker Peter Olivi is of particular importance here), there is a special type of cause – the so-called “terminative cause” (*causa terminativa*) which has no counterpart among the traditional four causes. Such a cause was postulated to explain the problem of ascendant causality, i.e. the question how ontologically inferior entities (such as material objects) can exert causal influence on the ontologically superior ones (such as souls and their cognitive powers). The presentation inquires into the question whether this notion of *causa terminativa* constitutes a special, fifth type of causality, or is reducible to one of the four traditional ones.

Marek Otisk

Aristoteles Christianus – Gerbert of Aurillac, Anselm of Canterbury, Roscelin of Compiègne and Others: The Peripatetic Tradition in the Latin Thinking of the 10th and 11th Centuries

The presentation focuses on the peripatetic (Aristotle’s) tradition in formulations and solutions of the chosen problems in the medieval Latin thinking of the 10th and 11th centuries. This paper deals mainly with the importance of the conception of the seven liberal arts; the division of philosophy and methodology of science and philosophy (for example so called Aristotelian-Ptolemaic system in astronomy or Aristotelian logic); topics related with philosophy of language (for instance Aristotle’s, Porphyry’s and Boethius’s texts on Category); the beginnings of the early scholastic controversy of universals (vocalism), included debate over trinity of God; the topic of God’s omnipotence etc.

Jacek Ruszczyński

Mariusz Wiktoryn – neoplatońska metafizyka w służbie teologii chrześcijańskiej

Mariusz Wiktoryn – retor, filozof i teolog. Działał w Rzymie w IV wieku po Chr. Reprezentuje neoplatonizm chrześcijański nawiązując bezpośrednio do poglądów Porfiriusz. Podjął dyskusję z arianinem Kandydem rozwijając problem zrodzenia w Bogu. Jak w Bogu możliwe jest zrodzenie? I tutaj mamy ciekawą wizję metafizyczną. Bóg jest pojmowany jako *ipsum esse*, ale to *ipsum esse* jest dla Wiktoryna możliwością (*potentia*), z której rodzi się akt czystej formy (*forma dei*), czyli Logos-Syn Boży. Aktualizacja dokonuje się w Bogu na zasadzie rodzenia i ożywiania. Moc ożywcza (*vivere*) rodzi więc życie, które jest już Synem Bożym. Wydaje się, że dalsza sprawczość Boga też polega na rodzeniu. W tym akcie rodzenia Bóg obdarza pojawiające się byty życiem, które jest pewną określoną formą. Jednocześnie ta forma jest rozumiana jako odpowiedni sposób istnienia danego bytu. Dlatego wszelkie życie bierze początek z Boga.

Janusz Sidorek

Husserl, Lotze i Platon

Jednym z założeń krytyki psychologizmu przedstawionej przez Husserla w *Prolegomenach do Badań logicznych* jest koncepcja „prawd samych w sobie”, których obowiązywanie jest niezależne od naszego poznania. Koncepcja ta w znacznej mierze została przejęta przez Husserla od Hermana Lotzego, który sformułował ją jako pewną interpretację Platońskiej teorii idei. Celem niniejszego szkicu jest porównanie argumentacji Lotzego i Husserla oraz wskazanie ontologicznych konsekwencji obu teorii.

Anna Laskowska

Aristoxenian theory of soul as harmony

Aristoxenus of Tarentum was one of the most talented Aristotle's students. He is known mainly as the greatest musicologist of Ancient Greece, author of *Elementa harmonica* and *Elementa rhythmica*, the oldest preserved treatises on music. But in the ancient tradition it is reported that he was a prolific author, writing on many subjects. In this paper I would like to focus on his theory of soul that survived to us in the form of synoptic remarks of Cicero and Lactantius (Wehrli fr. 118-121). In these fragments it is

clearly stated that Aristoxenus considered soul as harmony. This vision seems to echo an old concept, mentioned already in Platonic dialogue *Phaedo* that soul is like harmony in the musical instrument and in consequence it is mortal. But it can be shown that the Aristoxenian theory of soul is different from the Platonic exposition. The misinterpretation of Aristoxenus' thought by Cicero and then by Lactantius is based on a sort of simplification or/and misunderstanding of the vocabulary used by Aristoxenus, especially of the term harmony. Aristoxenus in his theory of music is not using the term *harmonia* in the sense of a perfect joining of the opposites as was Plato, but applies it only for denoting a type of musical scale (next to the diatonic and chromatic one). The word that corresponds to the idea of perfect euphony in music was *to hermosmenon* i.e. what is harmonized. This is the crucial term in the Aristoxenian theory of harmonics. By showing the significance of this term it can be demonstrated that Aristoxenus, against the opinion of Cicero and Lactantius, developed a soul-doctrine different from Plato and considered soul as immortal.

Agnieszka Blandzi, The problem of interpretation by Gregory Palamas hierarchical and symbolic structure of Pseudo-Dionysius world

The presented paper compare and discuss the detailed topic in the works of both thinkers which is the possibilities and conditions of the true knowledge of God. I examine Gregory Palamas's metaphysics of light and its application to the hierarchical and symbolic structure of Dionysius world. For many researchers the hierarchical and symbolic structure in which, Pseudo-Dionysius sees the opportunity to approach God seem pagan, neo-Platonic construction, impossible to be adaptable to a Christocentric vision of the Palamas' world.

Pseudo-Dionysius is convinced about the hierarchy as the special gift donated by God, in the immaterial and intellectual manner, to ensure the return of the each man, the process seen as the salvation and deification. According to Palamas intention of Pseudo-Dionysius is the expression through such construction of the world, straight, Christian idea that everything has been created with a view to return to his Creator. God wants a man to truly knew him, but due to the limitations of their cognitive powers man can approach the Creator gradually (hierarchically) discovering his footsteps in the world, properly interpreting symbols, participating in the liturgy, making self-improvement in the care and guidance of experienced teachers. Recognition possessed in this way only approaches to the true knowledge, which is obtained through deifying grace that transforms the whole man. The possibility of this transformation

is scoured by the divine-human nature of Christ penetrated by the common energy of the Trinity, standing at the basis of every hierarchy, as emphasized by the Pseudo-Dionysius. Palamas referring to the Scripture exegesis questioned and disputed fragments of Corpus Areopagiticum.

Gregory Palamas also shows that the intention of Pseudo-Dionysius is to present the hierarchy as a dynamic - opposite to a static structure where deification takes place automatically on passive entities.

Doctor of hesychasm emphasizes more on ethical dimension of Dionysian hierarchy, then on epistemological one, which is the consequence of the Christian revelation. Gregory wants to show ascending in the frame of the hierarchy like a common process, ie. available to every believer.

Leszek Skowroński

On the lack of morality in Aristotle's ethics.

In my presentation I adopt the distinction between morality and ethics introduced by Bernard Williams in his *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*. Morality, in the sense in which it is used for example in Kant's deontology is – according to Williams – an illusion of the modern mentality.

The main point I argue for is that Aristotle does not need morality in his practical philosophy, and so does not use moral categories like moral rightness, moral evil, moral duty etc. because he does not use the moral framework, which has become part of common sense for us. Elizabeth Anscombe made the same point when she observed that “If someone professes to be expounding Aristotle and talks in a modern fashion about "moral" such-and-such, he must be very imperceptive if he does not constantly feel like someone whose jaws have somehow got out of alignment: the teeth don't come together in a proper bite”.

There are at least two advantages to accepting the lack of morality in Aristotle's ethics: 1) his ethics could become less misunderstood and 2) there is a chance to learn something from Aristotle once he is no longer misunderstood. Contemporary moral philosophy has been proclaimed by some thinkers to be going through a crisis. A return to Aristotle (whose ethics served Europeans quite well for nearly two thousand years before the dawn of modernity) could help in coming out of this crisis. I understand the return to Aristotle which I argue for in a stronger sense than today's supporters of virtue ethics do. I claim that Aristotle was not a contemporary virtue ethicist although virtue ethicists themselves claim him as their patron saint. Virtue ethics is still operating within a moral framework in common with other contemporary moral theories.

Tomasz Tiuryn

Język i ontologia. Uniwersalia jako *pragmata* w obrębie Arystotelesowskiej koncepcji języka i znaczenia

Współcześnie myślimy o problemie uniwersaliów jako o zagadnieniu ontologicznym. Zgodnie z tym traktujemy uniwersalia jako pewien wyróżniony rodzaj bytów - mianowicie jako byty lub własności ogólne. Tymczasem w tradycji starożytnej, zwłaszcza w obrębie filozofii Arystotelesa, uniwersalia traktowane są przede wszystkim jako pewien rodzaj predykatów; ich głównym określeniem jest "to co może być z natury orzekane o wielu rzeczach" (De Int. 7). To nie oznacza jednak, że nie mają one żadnego statusu ontycznego, że są bytami czysto językowymi. Dla Arystotelesa konstytuują one bardzo ważną część *pragmata*, "rzeczy", a więc tego, co jest przedmiotem mówienia (*legein*) i orzekania (*kategorēin*). W obrębie Arystotelesowskiej koncepcji języka *pragmata* są tym, co jest oznaczane przez słowa (*phōnai*). Ponadto, *pragmata* są głównym obiektem Arystotelesowskiej teorii definicji zarysowanej w Topikach. W swoim referacie przedstawiam możliwe rozumienia Arystotelesowskich *pragmata* oraz poddaję analizie dwuznaczny status uniwersaliów jako zarazem rzeczy i predykatów. Wynikiem tych analiz są wnioski dotyczące statusu uniwersaliów u Arystotelesa jako bytów o niskim statusie ontycznym, których istnienie jest w pewnej mierze zależne od aktywności ludzkiego intelektu.

Artur Banaszkiewicz

Nisi ipse intellectus. Non-reductionist Leibniz's Philosophy of Mind in *New Essays on Human Understanding*

Developed in his polemics with Locke, Leibniz's conception of the mind based on the so called 'system commune' is an example of what the non-reductionist and non-naturalistic view has to offer in the philosophy of mind. In this paper I discuss the following issues: the status of New essays in Leibniz's works, the consciousness-mind relation as understood by both philosophers, conception of the innate and innate-acquired relation in the so called 'system commune'. I have divided this work into four parts. In the first one I present the status of New essays in Leibniz's works and I explain conception of the 'system commune'. In the second one I investigate Locke's arguments on the nativism and his conception

of the innate. Next, I discuss conception of the innateness, as proposed by Leibniz, and the mind-consciousness relation. Finally, I present the conclusions drawn from the above analyses.

Dariusz Piętko

The concept of intuition in Aristotle

Science, or more generally knowledge, is an organised set of propositions. Their arrangement, broadly speaking, is that particular propositions from the set are justified by propositions formerly accepted which are substantiated by those accepted before them, etc. In every process of justification, it is proved that at the end of the set, there is a proposition which does not have its reason in another proposition. Thus some primary propositions, accepted as a consequence of direct cognition, form the basis of every kind of knowledge. Intuition is one of its types. In antiquity, it was perceived as the most valuable way of cognition. For the pre-eminence of intellectual cognition over empirical experience and the pre-eminence of direct over indirect cognition were recognised. Therefore, purely rational and direct method would be ideal.

In Greek philosophical texts, terms *nous* or *noesis* were used to refer to what we define as intuition. However, it does not mean that *nous* and intuition are the same; for *nous* is used to indicate mind, reason, thinking, wisdom, the soul, and even the heart – it has thus a broader range of meaning. Although it was primarily used to denote only sensory direct cognition, with time its semantic content was broader. In philosophy, it is used in cognitive, ontic, and moral meanings.

A fundamental question related to the issue of intuition concerns its rationality. From today's point of view, when we accept weak rationality conditions of cognition – that is an intersubjective communicability and verifiability – we face the problem of value of intuitive cognition. How can intuitive cognition be intelligibly expounded and supported?

The concept of intuition is ambiguous. In the philosophy of ancient Greece, especially in the first great philosophical systems, rational (Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle) and irrational (Plato, Plotinus), intuition can be distinguished. Irrational intuition could be that intuition whose objects are transcendent ideas, or God's intuition whose object of perception is he himself. Hence rational intuition is concerned with either the rudiments of knowledge or the goals of human activity. Each of its type is characterized by some common features, such as directness, comprehensiveness of cognition, and obviousness. Differences concern the object, its intersubjectivity, and the sources of intuitive cognition.

For Aristotle, intuition allows to accept principles on which the edifice of knowledge is founded. It serves the function of a way of cognition thanks to which first premises of knowledge can be formulated. In this sense, one could perversely treat metaphysics, which is a science about principles [*Metaphysics*, 1003a], as a methodology for sciences. The most important question in Aristotle's teachings, to which, as far as I know, not much attention have been devoted in literature, is that the Stagirite introduced the confirmation procedure concerning some of (logical and ontological) principles known intuitively. The idea of confirmation is forced by accusations against, for example, the principle of non-contradiction, which made Aristotle present a certain extra-intuitive way of its substantiation. Aristotle's intention is to present the absurd consequences of its rejection. According to many scholars, he commits the fallacy of *petitio principii*, trying to substantiate the principle of non-contradiction. In fact, he formulates the so-called *elenctic* proofs in response to sophists' accusations; as he writes, they are not proofs in a narrow sense but refutations (*apodeikseis elenktikōs*) of the opponent's position in a debate (see *Metaphysics* 1006a), that is, refutations of an opposite position taken by the opponent (see *Prior Analytics* 66b). Probably, in the same rational and confirmative spirit, one should understand substantiation of ontological principles, for example, necessity of the first cause of movement or the ultimate of aim.

If we draw an analogy between intuitive cognition, understood as some kind of intellectual, non-empirical experience (although often preceded by empirical experience) with empirical experience, the validation of the results of experience in the second case is performed by the same empirical experience (conducted under slightly different conditions and at different times or from a slightly different perspective), or by inference. When we accept an autonomous value of intuitive cognition in preference to other methods, we can verify the results of intuition intuitively, or by inference.¹

¹ The idea of confirmation is found in the concept of intuition in Descartes. His intuition was a purely rational grasping of the object of cognition in which truths appeared in a direct and comprehensive way. Relations between, for example, the following propositions: $2+2=4$, $3+1=4$ and their consequence: $2+2=3+1$ must have been understood intuitively. For Spinoza, intuition may be represented by the fact that when we have a sequence of three integers and the ratio 1:2 is equal to the ratio 3:x, we find x, whose value will be in the same ratio to the third number as the second number is to the first number, so quickly that the whole event is represented as an intuitive flash. To find x, we do not need to transform the expression $1:2=3:x$ into $x=(3 \times 2):1$ from which we can recognize the value of x. Thus his intuition would be an instant inference.

Wojciech Wrotkowski

The Ties Between Anaxagoras and Empedocles According to Aristotle, Several Forgotten Ancient Commentators and Some Famous Modern Scholars: Methodology in the History of Philosophy

A famous passage in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (984 a8-16) states clearly that although the Clazomenian sage was born earlier than the philosopher from Acragas, it was Empedocles who was faster in publishing his own works. Surprisingly, it is almost unanimously assumed that this fact alone is decisive in establishing the hierarchy between Anaxagoras and Empedocles: almost all scholars presume that the older thinker depended heavily upon the younger. In my short presentation I try to show that in order to maintain such image of the history of ancient philosophy some famous modern scholars misuse the *testimonia* and abuse not only Anaxagoras himself, but also that decent minority of researchers who feel unable to overlook the fact that – according to Alcidas – it was Empedocles who had heard Anaxagoras and was jealous of him, not *vice versa*.

Stanisław Gromadzki

Nietzsche's Methods of Making Up His Own Philosophy

The peculiarity of Nietzsche's method is not specified by establishing conditions of possibility of philosophical statement, nor by reflecting upon given practices in the history of philosophy. Nietzsche's reflection on method belongs to his philosophy as an integral element and bears unique significance. Nietzsche chooses his own way of referring to philosophical tradition, but his intention is not only to do research and to reconstruct it. He plays a role of an artist-philosopher, who coins his own vision of philosophy in "the tragic age of the Greeks", who creates well-known people of culture in order to pin down the identity of his own philosophy, who dares to do genealogical research, to unveil the sources of many phenomena which take place in culture.

Wojciech Hanuszkiewicz

Plato's Theory of Virtue in the Interpretation of Paul Natorp and Sergei Hessen

Od lat 80-tych XX wieku odnotować można wzrost zainteresowania Arystotelesowską teorią cnót. W tym kontekście Platon ujmowany jest najczęściej jako prekursor Arystotelesa. Platońską teorię cnót

można jednak potraktować – zwłaszcza jeśli uwzględni się jej neoplatońską, a następnie chrześcijańską interpretację – jako konkurencyjny względem tradycji Arystotelesowskiej model ujęcia etyki społecznej. W ten sposób koncepcję Platona ujmuje Paul Natorp, a za nim Sergiusz Hessen. Ujęcia tych autorów – pochodzące bądź z ostatnich lat XIX wieku, bądź pierwszej połowy wieku XX-tego – pozwalają przede wszystkim w nowej perspektywie uchwycić toczący się od dłuższego czasu spór pomiędzy komunitarianami (orientującymi się właśnie na Arystotelesowską teorię cnót), a liberałami, dla których wartością nadrzędną nie są cnoty i związana z nimi koncepcja dobra wspólnego, lecz autonomia i indywidualna wolność podmiotu. Natorp z Hessenem w interesujący sposób łączą obie te perspektywy, pokazując – podobnie jak stara się to czynić współcześnie Charles Taylor – iż perspektywy te nie muszą się wzajemnie wykluczać.

Mikołaj Domaradzki

Arystotelesowska koncepcja homonimii

Zamysłem niniejszego wystąpienia jest wstępna rekonstrukcja Arystotelesowskiej koncepcji homonimii. W myśl proponowanego tu ujęcia Stagiryta za homonimiczne uznaje już to rzeczy, już to wyrazy stosownie do określonego kontekstu polemicznego. Kiedy bowiem Arystoteles podejmuje dyskusję z filozofią Platona, to homonimia jest przede wszystkim traktowana bardziej ontologicznie (homonimiczne są wówczas rzeczy). Kiedy natomiast Stagiryta podejmuje polemikę z sofistami i egzegetami, to homonimia jest przede wszystkim traktowana bardziej semantycznie (homonimiczne są wówczas wyrazy). W związku z powyższym Arystoteles negatywnie waloryzuje homonimię w dyskusjach dialektycznych, a pozytywnie w sztukach wytwórczych.

Daniel Roland Sobota

Aristotle in the 20th-Century

In 2015 the publishing company of IFiS PAN has been published Polish translation of Enrico Berti's book entitled *Aristotle in the 20th-Century* (trans. A. Dudzińska-Facca and D. Facca). Less than 15 years earlier in the same publishing house has published his small *Introduction to Metaphysics*. *Aristotle in the 20th-Century* is not so much about Aristotle, but it is "a book about 20th-century philosophy". It focuses

on the presence of Aristotle's thought in four currents or areas of contemporary philosophy. They are: German neohumanism (Ch. 1), Heidegger's thought (Ch. 2), analytic philosophy (Ch. 3) and practical philosophy (Ch. 4). Know that from every philosophical positions even Heidegger is an author, with whom Berti takes the most serious dispute, presenting on this occasion his standpoint called "classical metaphysics". In my speech I would like to recall the main theses and make a critical review of the position which are laid out in these Berti's books.